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We must also build and integrate the capabilities that can advance our 
interests, and the interests we share with other countries and peoples. Our 
Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must 
be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act 
in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; 
development experts who can strengthen governance and support human 
dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, 
strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries. 
—President Barack Obama 
 
A. THESIS RELEVANCE 
Advising is the historical foundation for the past, present, and future. The past 
years have shown that the United States Marine Corps (USMC) does not always institute 
the hard lessons learned. The military is filled with great individual American heroes, and 
by working together, they have an opportunity to travel to beautiful countries and work 
with amazing people. A limited number of Americans are provided the opportunity to 
advise people in foreign nations. With the right people and training, America can “help 
partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges” (White 
House, 2013, p. 2). The integration of military forces from different countries is now a 
reality. The role of advisor takes an exceptional person with a unique ability to 
understand indigenous people. That person is not a master in one subject but is 
knowledgeable in multiple areas. It is imperative to find the right people and provide 
them the right training to fulfill this nation’s strategic goals. 
Advisor teams today are conducting extensive training prior to deploying into a 
country or region that requires assistance. Their training is conducted at a Marine’s parent 
command, as well as alternative locations, depending on the mission. This research is 
focused on the Basic Advisor Course (BAC), located at Fort Story, Virginia. The course 
is a three-week long program, and once completed, Marines graduating receive a free 
military occupational specialty (MOS) to certify the successful completion of the course. 
The command responsible for conducting the class wants to determine if any areas of the 
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course can be improved upon. This objective led to this thesis’ research, which examines 
the training, doctrine, and manning of the advisor teams. Advising has advanced over the 
centuries, and defining key terms will provide a better understanding of how these terms 
are used today.  
B. ADVISING TERMINOLOGY  
Warfare is ever evolving; today; the world employs the flexibility of coalitions to 
fight battles, and rarely does one country fight alone. Coalitions are built to work together 
and share the costs of war. The American military and its international partners must 
work seamlessly to conduct actions, such as movement under fire, call for fire, and 
medevac’s. The Marine Corps cannot afford to train only Marines who will, in turn, train 
only other Marines. Today, all Marines need to be prepared to teach members of foreign 
militaries also.  
Commanders focus their units on training to win battles that will win the war. 
Marines spend the vast majority of their time training in the six warfighting functions of 
maneuver, fires, command and control, logistics, intelligence, and protection; however, 
something is missing. While the six warfighting functions provide detailed instruction for 
their categories, no current doctrine is shaping engagement with foreign partners. Adding 
a seventh function would address this need. 
To understand how to build partner capacity, it is necessary to understand a few 
key terms. The first term is “security cooperation” (SC). According to Joint Publication 
1-02, security cooperation is defined as, “all Department of Defense interactions with 
foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. 
security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access 
to a host nation” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. 221). SC is conducted in 
conjunction with allies to strengthen partnerships, build partner capacity, and provide 
access to partnered nations. Another set of policies that the United States (U.S.) 
government uses to assist the militaries of other states is security assistance (SA), which 
is managed by the State Department but administered by the Department of Defense 
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(DOD). SA is a collection of programs that provides military equipment, training, and 
financing. 
The second term is “security force assistance” (SFA). Joint Publication 1-02 
defines security force assistance as “the Department of Defense activities that contribute 
to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and 
capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2014). SFA was developed in 2009 by the Army and Special Operations 
command. SFA is a subset of SC and the military apparatus of foreign internal defense 
(FID), and it “is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or 
regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority” (Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2014b). This concept now applies to Special Operations Forces (SOF), the 
general purpose force, and civilian contractors.  
The third term is “engagement.” Joint Publication 1-02 defines engagement as the 
“routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of 
the United States (U.S.) and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and 
domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, 
coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. 
160). Engagement is how military forces got the job done in places like Vietnam, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan. Currently, engagement is not considered a warfighting function, and 
commanders do not have a Marine Corps doctrine to follow. 
The final term that must be understood is “advising.” Merriam-Webster’s 
dictionary defines advising as “to give (someone) a recommendation about what should 
be done” (“Advise,” n.d.). The term advisers became prominent during the Vietnam War. 
At the end of 1964, 23,000 advisors deployed to Vietnam to help train the South 
Vietnamese army “and while they were still called advisers at that point, they were in 
combat” (Woodward, 2014, p. 1). Woodward (2014) continues to state that by 1968, over 
500,000 U.S. troops were fighting in what would be known as America’s quagmire (p. 1). 
This escalation in the number of advisors may have stigmatized the term, given that so 
many troops moved into Vietnam and that their role changed over time. Understanding 
how advising has evolved to SC is important. 
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C. IMPACT 
SC is a fairly new term. It was “first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform 
Initiative (DRI)” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 1–1). Defense 
planning guidance has directed the services to include SFA as a core task, which implies 
the service’s capability to train advisors (White House, 2012, p. 4). This guidance is tied 
directly to an increasing need for phase zero, steady state activities to build partner 
capacity, in addition to the need for advisors throughout the six-phase campaign 
construct. The six phases of military operations start at phase zero and end with phase 
five. They include shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil 
authority. The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to the creation of many 
different types of USMC advisor teams. Table 1 shows a sample of some of these teams.  
Table 1.   List of Teams 
TEAM LIST 
military transition teams (MiTT) 
embedded training teams (ETT) 
federal police transition teams (FPTT) 
national police transition teams (NPTT) 
police transition teams (PTT) 
border training teams  (BTT) 
brigade training teams (BTT) 
mobile training teams (MTT) 
port of entry transition teams (PoETT) 
security forces assistance advisory team (SFAAT) 
Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) 
Police Operational Liaison Team (POMLT) 
Afghan uniformed police team (AUP) 
 
 
A foreign security force (FSF) is the term the Marine Corps has developed as an 
all-encompassing term for all foreign units that require advisory team support. On 
September 23, 2014, the Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 472/14 
announced the approval of the FSF advisor free MOS. This new MOS will have a direct 
impact on all future training and operations. FSF advisors must have extensive 
knowledge and experience in developing and influencing FSFs across the spectrum of 
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operations and conflict, particularly during steady-state activities and stability operations 
in a major campaign. From this point forward, all training/transition teams are referred to 
as FSF advisor teams or simply as advisor teams, unless quoted from other documents. 
Advisor training, development, and management are essential for the Marine 
Corps to have successful programs to support defense planning. Only a few people have 
the experience as a team member with insight into the management and training of 
advisor teams, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, to provide the necessary knowledge for 
comprehensive research. Analyzing the implications and best practices for tracking, 
developing, handling, and allocating Marine advisors requires an additional study and is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The training teams can have a major impact on the Marine Corps’ future. This 
study examines the history and best practices of FSF advisor teams to determine optimal 
training, doctrine, manning, and a course of action going forward. Supported by the 
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), this research focuses on 
determining the appropriate personnel and the training these personnel need to 
accomplish building partnership capacity (BPC) and SC requirements. 
D. THE AUTHOR’S MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE 
The Marine Corps sent me to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Kenya, 
Maldives, Iraq, and Afghanistan as a U.S. ambassador to do my part to secure U.S. 
national interests. As President Obama stated in the 2010 National Security Strategy 
(NSS), in each deployment, I did my part to “build capabilities while advancing 
America’s interests.” Although my part was small, my advisory skills developed from my 
first trip to Japan in 1994 to my last trip to Afghanistan in 2011.  
To a young enlisted man, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Kenya 
were eye-opening compared to a small town in rural New England. Looking back, the 
Marines conducted many hours on maneuvers, rifle ranges, and tactics and did not focus 
as much on culture, language, or ethnic training. As a result, once we arrived in our area 
of operations, it took time to understand how to interact appropriately with our foreign 
counterparts. In all the countries, when we interacted with the local people and military 
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units, we would make mistakes that alienated our unit. It took time for the unit to 
understand how to interact with the local populace. Once units began to feel comfortable 
with our interactions with our foreign counterparts, it was time to rotate back home.  
As an officer, my experiences in the Maldives, Iraq, and Afghanistan took me on 
a completely different path. Unlike my enlisted experiences prior to these deployments, 
more time was devoted to culture, language, and ethnic training to allow us to go into 
these countries with a little understanding of what to expect. For example, the Marine 
Corps tasked our infantry battalion to establish seven different advisor teams prior to 
going to Iraq to train and partner with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The teams’ 
manning came out of the Battalion’s table of organization (T/O) and received limited 
training. While deployed to Iraq with 2d Battalion, 24th Marines in Helmand Province, 
ranging from Ramadi to Fallujah, we spent much of our time advising and training the 
ISF. As the battalion coordinator for all seven teams, it was my first continuous exposure 
to working with members of a foreign military. Due to our training prior to deploying, it 
did not take as long to understand how to relate with the locals. I learned a lot from my 
experiences working with these teams, most importantly, how to interact with them. One 
after action report (AAR) or lesson learned that every team expressed was that they 
wanted more advisor training prior to deploying to another country. 
Two years later, my parent unit, 3rd Marine Air Wing (MAW), selected me to fill 
the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) individual augment (IA) requirement in support 
of an advisory mission to Afghanistan. While this took me out of an important job at the 
MAW, I trained with a great team for three months prior to deploying. The Advisor 
Training Cell (ATC) located at the MEF received all the IAs for training and preparation 
for the forward deployed role. The MEF training lasted two months. The teams were later 
evaluated on their advisor skills for a 30-day training evolution at the Advisor-Training 
Group (ATG) in Twenty-Palms, California, just prior to deploying. During the 
deployment, I served as the assistant team leader and operations officer of a training team 
and established the 707th AUP team in regional command (RC) southwest in 
Afghanistan. I was fortunate that all my prior experiences prepared me for my assignment 
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with the AUP. These experiences allow for a comprehensive review of the Marine Corps 
current advising program.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research was developed in conjunction with MCSCG needs and the thesis 
advisor’s requirements in the understanding of the current problem. This thesis attempts 
to provide insight to the following questions with the help of history, current practices, 
and detailed analysis. 
1. Primary Question 
 Based on historical Marine Corps engagements and partnerships, what 
fundamental skills should be taught in the basic Marine advisor course? 
2. Secondary Questions 
 What training document is needed to ensure continued success with 
engagement?  
 How should Marines be assigned to FSF teams? 
F. SCOPE 
This research analyzes the purpose and function of Marine Corps advisors from 
the 1900s onward. Following this historical background, previous and current 
management is examined to discern both efficiencies and deficiencies. Also, this thesis 
develops an AAR survey that allows MCSCG to implement changes in pre-training, 
training, and post-deployment training. Future researchers could use data from this 
project to explore what is needed for training second or third iteration advisors, or 
individuals with varying levels of experience on a team addressing advisor skills as a 
perishable skill.  
G. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis uses the human resource development process (HRDP) by conducting 
interviews and reviewing archived materials, such as policies, doctrinal publications, 
current organizational models, and other literary information to gain a better 
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understanding of where advising falls in the spectrum of the six warfighting functions. 
Appendix A provides a list of IRB approved questions that were asked during the 
interview process. A thorough review of training team requirements, processes, and 
procedures identifies gaps in the training and manning process. 
Chapter II discusses advising throughout history and how the USMC specifically 
has conducted training. Chapter III glances at the laws, strategies, and directives that 
shape engagement and conducts a literature review of previous studies. Chapter IV 
analyzes the training, doctrine, and manning of current processes, and Chapter V presents 




In Sicily about … the spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse with as many 
troops as he could bring from the cities which he had persuaded to join. 
Calling the Syracusans together, he told them that they must man as many 
ships as possible, and try their hand at a sea fight, by which he hoped to 
achieve an advantage in the war not unworthy of the risk. 
—Thucydides 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If doomed to repeat history, then why not spend more time learning from it? 
Military advising to help other countries improve their capabilities during both war and 
peace is not a new concept. As the quote states, a Spartan General Gylippus persuaded 
the Syracusans to build a navy because he knew that with a navy, he would be able to 
fight the Athenians on land and sea (Thucydides et al., 1996, p. 439). It is not the first 
time one country or nation helped another improve its military capabilities. In fact, many 
documented and undocumented instances have been recorded throughout history. This 
chapter covers two sections. The first discusses examples in which advisor events had 
history-altering effects, and the second examines how the Marine Corps has evolved to 
train teams to deploy as advisors.  
B. ADVISING THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
One exceptionally trained combatant can turn the tide of a conflict. This section 
analyzes five times throughout history when advising made an impact. Starting with the 
Peloponnesian war, which is one of the earliest known interventions in recorded history, 
four additional instances are reviewed in which America itself received, or employed 
advisors.  
1. Peloponnesian War 
The act of providing and receiving training between countries dates back to the 
Peloponnesian war, fought from 431 to 404 B.C.E. between the allies of Athens and the 
Spartan-led Peloponnesian league. In 414, Sparta decided to send “immediate aid to the 
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Sicilians, and naming Gylippus son of Cleandridas to the command of the Syracusans” 
(Thucydides et al., 1996, p. 416). One Spartan General, Gylippus, was sent to aid the 
Syracusans on the island of Sicily. According to Thucydides, Gylippus’ leadership was 
critical to deal a devastating blow to both the Athenian army and navy, which sank 220 
ships or about 66 percent of the Athenian naval fleet and killed 40,000 soldiers and 
sailors (p. 439). Gylippus was one superbly trained general who advised, trained, and 
educated the Syracusans, and as a result, changed the course of history. The 
Peloponnesian War happened almost 2,500 years ago, and yet lessons on the benefits of 
advising can be learned from this battle still today.  
2. The American Revolutionary War 
In 1777, with the aid of advisors, a rebel force comprised of militia, fought 
against a large more professional field army. That rebel force, fighting for its 
independence from the mighty British Crown, would later become the United States of 
America. The Continental military was a regular army; however, it was mostly made up 
of militias that did not constitute a professional army. The Continental Congress was able 
to secure advisors from other countries to help train the military, countries like Prussia 
where people like Friedrich von Steuben, a military officer who drilled the militias, 
greatly improved the soldiers’ capabilities. Another advisor, Frenchmen Gilbert du 
Motier, marquis de La Fayette, served as a general and fought bravely in the Continental 
Army. Direct military assistance from foreign forces in the form of advisors, fleets, and 
ground troops provided decisive aid to America. 
3. Banana Wars 
America engaged in numerous small conflicts from around the end of the 
Spanish-American War in 1902 to the Good Neighbor Policy of the mid-1930s. The U.S. 
military fought battles on the islands of the Caribbean to the shores of Latin America. 
Marines would cynically refer to these military interventions as the Banana Wars 
(Langley, 1985. p. xviii). During that time, American foreign policy had four goals, one 
of which was to “support American investors in these underdeveloped agricultural 
countries” (Moskin, 1992, p. 149) of the Caribbean. In his book, J. R. Moskin (1992) 
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paints a portrait of why America was so dedicated to the region. “American financiers 
built railroads; the United Fruit Company grew to gigantic proportions; mining interests 
and banks moved in; and sugar plantations were concentrated under American Control” 
(p. 150). The U.S. military deployed to the region when its investments came under 
attack. 
Specifically, a large insurrection began in Nicaragua in 1912, and at the request of 
the Nicaraguan President, the U.S. government tasked the Marines to take the lead in the 
local government. The longest of the Banana Wars, this conflict led to the Marines 
spending 20 years in the country. During this time, the Marine Corps began learning what 
worked when dealing with an insurrection in foreign countries. One important lesson was 
how to win the hearts of the locals. Smedley Butler arrived in Granada with rations, 
provided Red Cross supplies, and forced the surrender of the rebels; thereby, gaining the 
admiration of the locals. These lessons lead to the “gratitude of the inhabitants, who had 
been at the mercy of their vindictive enemies for several weeks, was unbound and freely 
and frankly expressed-especially by the women of that city” (Metcalf, 1939, p. 413). 
While Marines were in the countries, they would build roads and bridges while 
establishing health care and instituting schools. Law and order was preserved through 
active patrolling and with the aid of the locals. During this time, the Marine Corps 
learned some very valuable lessons on advising and detailed them in the manual Small 
Wars Manual. The manual states, “Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants’ 
minds the leading ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property, and 
individual liberty” (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1990, p. 32). The Small 
Wars Manual was the Marine Corps’ first attempt at capturing the lessons of state-
building and counterinsurgency.  
4. Vietnam War 
The U.S. Army and USMC had different views of how to fight the war in 
Vietnam. In his book, E. F. Murphy (1997) states that the Marines did not agree with 
General Westmoreland’ and challenged his strategy (p. 38). The Marines believed that his 
strategy “was nothing more than a war of attrition” (p. 37). The Army had a “search and 
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destroy” methodology; thus, by attrition, they could deny territory to the North 
Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. The U.S. Army did not care about the villages because 
they were looking for a decisive engagement to defeat the enemy. The Marine Corps had 
“likened their strategy to a ‘spreading ink blot,’ and planned to work their way outward 
from their enclaves, enlarging the secure areas up and down the coast where the vast 
majority of South Vietnam’s population lived” (p. 38).  
The Marine Corps believed that pacification of the villages would work because 
of past experience. By necessity, a Marine battalion was running low on replacements 
while having its area of responsibility expanded (Moskin, 1992, p. 638). Therefore, to 
mitigate the shortage of Marines, “Combined Action Companies were created with a 
Marine squad and a Navy corpsman assigned to work with each Popular Force platoon. 
The first of these units was established at Phu Bai by 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines-partly as 
an expedient way to stretch the thinly spread battalion there” (p. 638).  
This strategy was the beginning of the Marine Corps combined action platoon. 
They would live and patrol in the villages and gain the trust of the local villagers. The 
USMC did show some success, however; “Although General Westmorland 
acknowledged the benefits of the Combined Action Platoons, he did virtually nothing to 
encourage their use” (Murphy, 1997, p. 37). Thus, the strategy of big army looking for 
decisive engagements ruled the conflict. 
5. Post 9/11 Campaigns: Afghanistan and Iraqi Wars 
Both campaigns enjoyed swift conventional victories, yet in both cases, the 
United States failed to understand effectively what happens after a conflict in a culture 
that does not have the same values and understanding of government systems. This lack 
of understanding has provided valuable lessons; thereby, “retaining, collecting, and 
analyzing current SFA efforts helps future Advise and Assist operations reduce the risk 
of repeating mistakes and improving the chance of success of future efforts across the 
globe” (Payne, Osberg, & Rand Corporation, 2013, p. 1). Coalition forces developed 
partnering and training tactics for both Afghan and Iraq forces to combat the insurgency 
with different measures of success.  
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U.S. military forces won the war quickly and decisively in both countries; 
however, they continued to look for conventional battles even after winning the war. U.S. 
military leaders continued to look for the large battles to gain momentum and crush the 
enemy, which is the right course of action when a military faces a formidable enemy of 
approximately the same size; however, it does not work against an insurgency. The 
military made considerable gains when partnered with the FSF. From conducting all 
missions to observing the FSF conduct the missions, “for the past 12 years, the United 
States and Coalition Forces have committed to developing the capacity of the Afghan 
security forces” (U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, 2014, p. 1). This process 
took time; at first, U.S. forces performed the missions and then explained how to execute 
the missions. Next, the U.S. military demonstrated the missions as the FSF observed. 
Then, the FSF imitated the U.S. military as they both accomplished the mission. Finally, 
the FSFs conducted the planning and execution of the missions as U.S. forces observed 
their actions. This process allowed the U.S. military to relearn and improve advising. 
Phases four and five, stabilizing and enable civil authority, are thus allowed to help 
complete the cycle to return to phase zero of operational planning, which is the desired 
steady state.  
6. Conclusion 
History shows that the blood and treasure of another country is the best way to 
fight battles. Sicilians dealt a heavy blow to the Athenians with the help of one advisor 
2,500 years ago. As a result, Sicilians regained control of their island, and on a grander 
scale, the Spartans were able to win the war. It does not matter if you are Sicilian, 
American, South Vietnamese, or an Afghan or Iraqi; motivated people, who receive just a 
little help through advisors, are empowered to fight for themselves, which is especially 
true if they can find someone who actually believes in the justification of the fight. The 
United States has recently invested 14 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. During those 
combat years, many lessons have been learned, and in some cases, relearned. Advisors 
are the common denominator and a force multiplier. In these five examples of wars, the 
use of advisors has shown how people can be trained to win the battles, which ultimately, 
wins the war.  
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C. MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMANDS 
The Marine Corps has created and recreated ways to conduct manning and 
training for advisor teams. As a necessity, the Marine Corps created commands to 
provide specific training to exclusive teams to combat insurgency. The Marine Corps 
evolved the advisor-training units as the missions grew and lessons were learned. These 
sections explores the history of the different units used to man, train, and certify teams 
who deployed as advisor units that developed at the beginning of the Iraq and Afghan 
wars. 
1. Advisor Training and Certification Prior to the Insurgency in Iraq 
History has shown that advising has been intertwined with the military and its 
execution in foreign countries. An example is Iraq, where no formal training unit was 
designated within the Marine Corps to conduct the training prior to the insurgency 
because prior to the insurgency, the host nation (HN) received little engagement training. 
Traditionally, Marine Corps infantry units focus most efforts on the warfighting 
functions. The functions serve as planning aids for the execution of operations. Marine 
Corps doctrinal publication (MCDP) 1-0 states, “by integrating the warfighting functions, 
the commander can increase the force’s combat power, mass capabilities on the enemy, 
and aid in the assessment of the operation’s success” (Headquarters, United States 
Marine Corps, 2011). Warfighting consists of six functions: command and control, 
maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. According to the MCDP, 
“the warfighting functions encompass all military activities performed in the battlespace” 
(Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2011). However, units have trained mainly to 
the six identified functions. Most unit training stops after you take the hill and 
consolidate and prepare for a counter attack.  
According to MCDP 1-0, “the warfighting functions apply equally to 
conventional and other types of operations, such as information operations, 
counterinsurgency, or other forms of irregular warfare” (Headquarters, United States 
Marine Corps, 2011). However, nowhere in the six functions does it address engagement, 
foreign security forces, or security cooperation. The six functions demonstrate how to 
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execute the fight. Once the war is over, immediate withdrawal without a stable 
government in place could create a vacuum that undesirables attempt to fill. One item 
missing that could help execute the withdrawal is proper execution of the exit strategy in 
phases four and five. The local population needs structure and instruction to build itself 
back up. When America defeats the enemy, what is left is shattered pieces of society and 
the United States has historically taken the responsibility to return the country to a 
productive nation that is a responsible entity within the world economy.  
2. Iraq and Afghanistan Advisor Training and Certification after the 
Insurgency in Iraq 
Once the Marine Corps realized that America was fighting an insurgency, it 
determined that it needed specialized training to rout the insurgency and withdraw from 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This section follows the evolution of the Marine Corps training 
units.  
 a. Advisor Training Center  
One of the first attempts to formalize training, in the general force, took place 
when the MEF in Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton created the ATCs. The Iraq era 
was the first time general forces were asked to advise on a large scale since Vietnam. 
ATCs were attached to each MEF Headquarters Group (MHG) and were the central 
location for training the different FSF advisor teams who would deploy to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. MEF commanders wanted FSF advisor teams to be capable of assessing, 
training, and advising partnered nations (PN), while maximizing their own survivability. 
The envisioned end state is when PN forces are capable of continual operations without 
U.S. assistance.  
The idea was that the ATC would become a “train the trainer” type of command: 
“The cell focuses on language and culture training, combat marksmanship, combat 
lifesaving, communications and Humvee training in addition to preparing the teams for 
partnering and mentoring missions in Afghanistan” (Burton, 2010, p. 1). Manpower 
requests for advisors were sent to the subordinate commands within the MEF, and once 
identified, they reported to MHG. In a Marine Corps news article, Cpl Burton (2010) 
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stated, “the ATC’s mission is to form, equip, train, deploy and redeploy advisor teams to 
Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom” (p. 1). All teams, regardless of 
task, were sent to the ATC to gain the necessary training. The end results were teams that 
could deploy into a country and train the PN or HN.  
 b. Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group  
Based in Fort Story, Virginia, the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group 
(MCTAG) was created in 2007 to provide an “enduring institutional capacity that 
demonstrated the Marine Corps’ commitment to global defense and security cooperation” 
(Marine Corps Training & Advisory Group [MCTAG], 2014). MCTAG was created to 
help combatant commanders build partner capacity through SFA missions.  
According to the MCTAG command brief, 
MCTAG coordinates and oversees USMC SFA efforts, assists regional 
Marine Forces (MARFOR)s in identifying and sourcing Partner Nation 
training requirements, and enables USMC Operating Forces, Marine 
Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), and Supporting Establishment Teams in 
executing SFA missions (MCTAG Command Brief). Additionally, the 
MCTAG command briefs desired endstate was that MCTAG provides a 
coordinated, synchronized approach to SFA resulting in the establishment 
of persistent, long-term relationships with Partner Nations and increases 
their capacity in consonance with theater security cooperation and 
engagement plans. (MCTAG, 2014) 
However, the title MCTAG was not enduring after all. While the group was 
deactivated in 2011, its mission would expand and merge with the ATG to become what 
it is today. 
 c. Advisor Training Group  
The ATG was established at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center 
Twentynine Palms, California, in 2008 to certify training teams prior to deploying into 
theater. The certification phase of training was known as Block IV training and ensured 
that all FSF advisor teams, prior to deployment, had full immersion scenario exercises to 
evaluate the training teams’ theater-specific protected mission. This training included role 
players who served as partner-force soldiers and leaders, as well as key civilian 
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personalities, such as tribal chiefs, to assess each team’s ability to address various 
scenarios. At the end of a 30-day assessment, teams were certified ready to deploy if they 
met the threshold of the training requirements. In 2014, on order of Headquarters Marine 
Corps (HQMC), the ATG was deactivated. 
 d. MCSCG 
The MCSCG, located in Fort Story, Virginia, was established in 2011 as the result 
of a consolidation of MCTAG and Marine Corps Security Cooperation Education 
Training Center (MCSCETC). The MCSCG’s mission is a combination of the MCTAG, 
ATG, ATC and SCETC. The MCSCG’s missions is to  
coordinate, manage, execute, and evaluate U.S. Marine Corps security 
cooperation programs and activities to include assessments, planning, 
related education and training, and advisor support to ensure unity of 
effort in building partner security forces capacity and capability in order to 
facilitate USMC and regional Marine Forces component command 
security cooperation objectives. (MCTAG, 2014) 
The MCSCG is now the “Marine Corps primary SC organization for non-policy 
issues” (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2014a, p. 5–2). Its duties include 
proposing SC education, managing quotas for the Defense Institute for Security 
Assistance Management (DISAM), training advisors, reviewing and managing SC 
training standards, certifying Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)/SC teams, 
conducting capabilities-based assessments, validating global force management and 
foreign military financing program requirements, providing planning and execution 
support to the MARFORs and MAGTFs, providing in-country coordination and liaison 
support, executing the education and training programs for international students, 
supporting the development and reviewing all SC related documents, and maintaining a 
SC information repository. The MCSCG’s coordination, liaison, assessment, and training 
teams (CLATT) develop 3–5 year FSF-specific plans and work with tasked MEF units to 
operationalize those training plans. The MCSCG also regularly sends staff members with 
FSF advisor teams to ensure that the training group has complete situational awareness of 
current issues.  
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3. Conclusion 
Before the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps did not 
conduct specialized training for Marines going to participate in advising. Since its initial 
startup, the ATC at I MEF is now the Advisor Training Branch under G-7 and ATC at II 
MEF is completely stood down. The ATG and MCTAG are no longer in existence and 
their mission has been assumed by the MCSCG. The MCSCG in Fort Story, Virginia has 
incorporated all roles into its security cooperation mission. By having one unit, the 
training better prepares the teams to meet the goal of “develop[ing] innovative, low-cost, 
and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, 
rotational presence, and advisory capabilities” (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). 
Advisor training is an absolute necessity for the Marine Corps’ future; hence, the 
MCSCG is vital to the continued success of the Marine Corps as a viable global force.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Advising is a complicated process that has impacted major events throughout 
written history. This chapter provides a small sample of five events and the impact those 
events had on advising through engagement. Marine Corps leaders realized that they 
needed to incorporate the lessons learned from history and teach fundamental skills to 
those who would be executing counterinsurgency operations. More specifically, after 
over a decade of combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military 
recognizes that valuable lessons must be captured. Consequently, the second half of this 
chapter focuses on the development of the Marine Corps training units since the start of 
the insurgency during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. These conflicts resulted in the 
emergence of the MCSCG, which trains teams to address the complete spectrum of SC. 
However, once fighting is complete, the real diplomacy begins. No nation can 
lose a war and then stand up a functional government without help. If the U.S. 
government wins, it is obligated to help a new government emerge from the ashes. 
Without this help, a vacuum is left that encourages others to seize power for themselves, 
which allows for more problems in the future. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and 
advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable 
truth—America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is 
essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security 
and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all people. The 
question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead. 
—President Barack Obama 
 
In the new 2015 NSS, President Obama lays out his vision regarding the 
important issues facing America and his priorities to deal with them. As the quote 
outlines, leadership is essential to accomplish this mission; however, it is not the only 
essential factor for a successful strategy. This chapter covers two sections. The first 
section analyzes national level documentation, for example, the new 2015 NSS, and how 
it shapes advising. The second section examines previous studies and their findings on 
the different elements of advising. The constraints imposed by national level 
documentation, as well as the recommendations suggested by previous studies, 
collectively offer criteria that can be used to assess the current advising process. 
A. NATIONAL DIRECTIVES 
Recent U.S. national strategy and policy directives place new constraints for 
commands to follow. These directives, provided by elected civilian leaders, govern the 
U.S. military in the form of strategy, directives, and guidance. The end result is the 
direction needed to achieve success in the national security strategy. Leaders in the DOD 
interpret these documents through many lenses to strengthen the U.S. military. For 
example, one area of focus is SC. National guidance speaks to the need to conduct SC, 
and the benefits it creates, such as preventing conflict, deterring aggression, reassuring 
allies/partners, deepening relationships/trust, increasing responsiveness, burden sharing, 
maximizing effects and minimizing costs, mobilizing collective action, BPC, specializing 
capabilities, reducing U.S. casualties, interoperability, assuring access, increasing 
permissive environments, increasing professionalism, and minimizing miscalculation to 
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name a few (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013, p. 14). In the case of SC, 
national documentation provides direction for advisors on how to engage foreign 
militaries.  
A flow diagram illustrates the linkage between all the documents the military uses 
at the strategic and operational levels to achieve a comprehensive strategy for a specific 
country as shown in Figure 1. The documents that support national strategies and policies 
based on law and world events are shown in column 1. National level guidance and 
direction that these devices should follow are shown in column 2. Many of these 
documents are classified, which causes the content to be beyond the scope of this 
research. The regional/service level guidance is divided into service and combatant 
command categories as shown in column three. The service category has maritime and 
Marine Corps directives that give the individual services detailed direction on how to 
organize, man, train, and equip their forces to achieve the objectives laid out in the NSS, 
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and National 
Military Strategy (NMS) among others. Global Force Management sources the 
manpower that the combatant commanders employ, as directed by the Guidance for 
Employing the Force (GEF). These orders are classified and are beyond the scope of this 
research. However, it is important to understand how they work together to achieve 
country development; the end product is a country level strategy that shapes the 
militaries’ responsibilities to ensure that SC is achieved. 
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Figure 1.  Cooperation Documentation Flow Diagram  
 
Source: Marine Corps Training & Advisory Group (MCTAG). (2014). Command Brief 
Naval SC Enabling Organization Conference [PowerPoint]. Retrieved from https://cno. 
ahf.nmci.navy.mil/n3/webdoc01.nsf/BE0307CF79DF0BD986257766005C1730/$File/Da
y%201%20-%20MCTAG%20Brief.ppt 
1. National Strategies, Policies, and Guidance 
National strategies and policies demonstrate the linkage of how laws and acts 
combine with world events and other strategies to shape country-level guidance. This 
section examines the national security strategies and polices, along with directives from 
the DOD’s national level guidance. Together, these directives provide the foundation for 
training, planning, and manning teams to execute a specific country-level guidance plan 
to support America’s national level objectives.  
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 a. 2015 National Security Strategy  
If the collection of national security directives is the foundation of SC, then the 
2015 National Security Strategy is the cornerstone that all other documents support. This 
document expresses America’s long-term national security interests and how to address 
them for the foreseeable future.  
More than the 2010 NSS, the 2015 NSS demands that U.S. agencies work with 
capable partners. The President states that working with partners is essential for 
international engagement, “These partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the 
burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that 
govern responsible international behavior” (White House, 2015, p. 3). By supporting 
other countries to defend themselves, America can then refocus its resources to address 
other challenges. The President continues to say, “Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to 
work with other countries to counter the ideology and root cause of violent extremism 
will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield” (p. ii). 
This executive guidance orders the military to train foreign countries to stand up and fight 
with America. Battlefields are evolving, and America must help shape this evolution by 
preparing countries to engage.  
Essentially, the U.S. military must provide the training to build the capabilities of 
its allies. If America wants to battle extremists, it is necessary to act “decisively to defeat 
direct threats, we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and 
consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and dangerous ideologies” (White 
House. 2015, p. 7). The new NSS clearly indicates that working in coalitions is the future 
of modern warfare. America does not engage threats on its own; it needs to provide 
training to allies, so they can stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. military. After this 
training is complete, U.S. allies look to America to provide additional leadership. 
To achieve these desired results, the military must provide the right manning, in 
the right place, and at the right time. President Obama highlights the significance of 
America’s leaders in the 2015 NSS, which emphasizes that the appropriate individuals 
must be selected to further America’s interests. The president states that this nation is 
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“leading international coalitions to confront the acute challenges posed by aggression, 
terrorism and disease” (White House, 2015, p. i). SC through engagement is a large piece 
in the military’s future, and therefore, America’s military leaders must have the expertise, 
knowledge, and social skills to interact with other communities worldwide. In other 
words, U.S. military leadership should be a source of inspiration on the global stage. 
 b. 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance  
To strengthen relationships with foreign nations, the Secretary of Defense 
advocates for strong training to build allied forces. Consequently, both the Secretary of 
Defense and the President offer input on the 2012 DSG, which provides guidance and 
sets priorities for the DOD. The 2012 DSG is linked to the 2010 NSS; however, it is not in 
direct alignment with the new 2015 NSS because that document was released after the 
2012 DSG. The 2012 DSG defines 10 primary missions to the U.S. Armed Forces, and 
six of these directly relate to SC training.  
Listed first is the mission of counterterrorism (CT). The 2012 DSG advocates 
putting continuous pressure on al-Qaeda and enlisting FSF to help accomplish this 
mission by preparing such forces to fight the CT battle (White House, 2012, p. 4). Along 
the same lines, the 2012 DSG lists deterring and defeating aggression as second. SC 
provides access into other countries where relationships can be built; this initial entrance 
into a nation is critical to BPC, which in turn, allows for a unified effort against 
aggression. Additionally, the third mission directs the United States to project power in a 
display of sound deterrence that would inhibit enemies from succeeding in their 
objectives (p. 5). By gaining direct entry to the objective area through its partnerships, the 
U.S. military has more mission execution freedom. For instance, the U.S. military needs 
access to locations like the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and the sea port of 
debarkation (SPOD), and permission to perform overflight and refueling in these areas; 
however, the United States might not need these. After all, it is what the USMC’s forcible 
entry can provide if needed.  
The eighth primary mission directs the military to provide a stabilizing presence 
to “conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational 
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deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises” (White House, 2012, p. 5). 
This presence allows U.S. forces to build partner capacity and reinforce deterrence as a 
stabilizing force that reassures this nation’s allies. Subsequently, the 2012 DSG lists 
conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations as ninth. A military-to-military 
engagement builds stability, and thereby, reduces insurgency and the demand for U.S. 
forces (p. 6). Advising allows shared experiences, through engagement, that sanctions a 
united effort to combat insurgency. Finally, the tenth mission focuses on U.S. forces 
providing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other operations, when tragedy 
strikes worldwide. Accessibility and partnership allows effective and efficient execution 
during the response to allies and PNs. Together, they provide logistics, response, 
information sharing, specialized capabilities, funding, resources, and assets in a timely 
manner to help those in need. 
Based on this document, coherent and well-trained teams are essential to meet 
these directives. After a decade of war, the Secretary of Defense articulated a need to 
recalibrate the military and make additional investments to win future conflicts. One way 
to succeed is to train more teams to meet the challenges of SC. By continuing the training 
and advising mission, U.S. forces help allied and partnered militaries to succeed.  
 c. 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Programs provided through SA, like the military-to-military exercises, produce “a 
regionally focused force to provide additional tailored packages that achieve critical 
global and regional objectives, including in critical areas, such as the Asia-Pacific region” 
(Secretary of Defense, 2014, p. 23). The Secretary of Defense signs the congressionally 
mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) every four years, which validates the 
DSG. Like the 2012 DSG, the 2014 QDR directs the military to adapt from the decade-
long war and look to the future. The QDR also looks to reshape and rebalance the 
military to meet the challenges of the 21st century.  
In his assessment of the 2014 QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
provides a prioritized list of defense missions. The ninth of twelve priorities is to conduct 
military engagements and security cooperation. The 2014 QDR also provides a list of 
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three risks that might inhibit the ability to achieve the priorities. The second risk listed is 
that it is essential to rely on allies and partners. The U.S. military accepts risk when 
relying upon PNs for collective action; therefore, it is in America’s best interest to 
provide training to those nations to mitigate and reduce that risk.  
The world has globalized and no country can stand against the challenges alone. 
The 2014 QDR states that “maintaining U.S. global posture and presence to support 
stability, security, and prosperity will become more challenging” (Secretary of Defense, 
2014, p. 34). The best way to face those challenges and to build global security is through 
engagement and SC. The United States stands together with its partners and allies to face 
the common threats during globalization.  
 d. 2011 National Military Strategy 
The adaptive military leadership faces new challenges in a time of austerity. The 
2011 NMS provides the “ways and means” for the military to further America’s national 
interests while counting on fewer resources. The 2011 NMS validated the 2010 NSS and 
QDR reports with an emphasis on four national military objectives: counter violent 
extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, 
and shape the future force.  
Manning and training plays a central role when two of the four national military 
objectives are directly related to security cooperation. To counter the violent extremists, 
the report states, “we will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable 
partner capacity to enhance security” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. 6). According to this 
strategy, advising teams must consist of individuals who can cooperate with foreign 
militaries to achieve the international community’s goal of enhanced security. The report 
also speaks about the need to strengthen international and regional security.  America 
must collaborate with other nations to “preserve forward presence and access to the 
commons, bases, ports, and airfields commensurate with safeguarding our economic and 
security interests worldwide” (p. 10).  Advisers must be trained in a wide array of skills 
and acquire the adaptability to operate in an ever-evolving environment. American 
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interests are best secured when the United States provides the best training by the best-
manned military. 
 e. Conclusion 
A review of the national strategies/policies with a focus on SC indicates training 
and manning are important to gaining access, nurturing partnerships, and building partner 
capacity. These documents provide the necessary direction to create a SC vision. The 
new 2015 NSS, along with the 2012 DSG, and 2014 QDR, directs the military to build 
capable coalition partners able to stand with America in the battles of the future. The 
updated 2015 NSS gives fresh guidance from the President and the National Security 
Council’s perspective and focuses the U.S. military training. When looking through the 
lens of SC, a review of the 2011 NMS emphasizes both manning and training during this 
time of austerity. Even though the updated 2015 NSS was just released, the older 
directives are cyclical and still in effect for utilization in planning. Understanding the 
effects of national strategies and policies on how the U.S. military is to organize, man, 
train, and equip allows this thesis to direct the focus on training, doctrine, and manning. 
2. Regional/Service Level Guidance 
While the previous section examines the national level, this section assesses 
regional and service level guidance. Regional and service level guidance covers two 
components. Regional guidance provides the combatant commanders with the theater 
strategy and theater campaign plans, which are classified and beyond the scope of this 
research. Service guidance is also divided into two sections, maritime and Marine Corps. 
While the Marine Corps is a part of the Navy, the maritime function is beyond the scope 
of this research. Expeditionary and planning guidance is the focus of this research and 
addresses specifically training, doctrine, and manning. Expeditionary Force-21 and the 
Commandants Guidance are updated directives that generate detailed focus for the 
Marine Corps.  
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 a. Expeditionary Force-21 
The Expeditionary Force-21 (EF-21) is the Marine Corps’ vision of how the 
Marine Corps will organize, man, train, and equip to accomplish its future objectives. EF-
21 is an update to the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025. EF-21 establishes focus 
areas, one of which is conducting SC. The Marine Corps plans to provide training teams, 
task forces, and Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) that have received proper 
training for the area to which they are assigned. The Marine Corps understands that 
“building partner capacity often results in more responsible, competent security forces, 
able to resolve a local crisis before it becomes a threat to U.S. interests and requires 
intervention” (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2014b, p. 30). Therefore, 
engagement is the best tool to use to ensure that security is achieved. EF-21 states that SC 
is a key contribution to meeting the geographic combatant commander’s requirements 
when assisting a PN. A major accomplishment is achieved when a PN can act and resolve 
issues before the U.S. military must become involved.  
 b. 36th Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2015 
The Commandant’s planning guidance (CPG) updates guidance on how the 
Marine Corps sets the conditions to fight and win against future enemies” (Headquarters, 
United States Marine Corps, 2015, p. 2). In a budget-constrained environment, the 
Marine Corps has to streamline manning to meet this nation’s challenges. The CPG 
outlines the new Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) priorities for his coming 
tenure. 
The CPG speaks to the degraded unit cohesion and manpower practices that have 
created significant gaps in leadership. The CMC conducted an “overhaul of our 
manpower management and readiness reporting models, systems, policies, and processes 
[that] will allow the Marine Corps to minimize personnel turbulence, increase unit 
stability, and develop cohesion” (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2015, p. 7). 
Manpower is key to the CMC because he wants to ensure that this country is combat 
ready. The CMC also feels that certain capabilities need “immediate attention.” Building 
partner capacity is the first he lists. CPG identifies BPC as an, “increasingly important 
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component of the Nation Defense Strategy” (p. 11). Partnered security cannot be 
achieved without the right manning available to accomplish the requirement. 
3. Conclusion 
Marine Corps guidance is an interpretation of the national strategies/policies, 
national level guidance, and service level guidance that provides direction to organize, 
man, train, and equip the force, including preparing for advisory missions. A simplified 
visual representation of the linkages of all the documentation to achieve SC is shown in 
Figure 1. Currently, three of the documents are less than a year old. Therefore, the 
concept is young and the results will cause many changes in the coming years. What is 
apparent is that these directives provide guidance to the U.S. military to work with other 
countries in achieving peace. While the United States is prepared to act unilaterally if it 
must, however, the military needs to prepare to take the lead to build partner capacity.  
B. RELATED STUDIES 
Where strategic guidance, orders, and directives, an agenda of training, doctrine, 
and manning provide a framework to develop the FSF advisor team capabilities, the 
following related studies represent a sample of research that supports the specific 
training, doctrine, and manning requirements for the FSF advisor team competencies. 
These related studies offer evidence on the impact of training, doctrine, and manning on 
engagement while providing the necessary background information, current regulations, 
and practices.  
1. Training 
With enough training, most people can learn to do almost anything. Advisor 
training is the fundamental tool that prepares Marines to work with foreign militaries. 
Marines must receive training certification to train foreign militaries. First, train to know 
the job, and learn how to transfer the knowledge to others. When working with FSF, 
transferring knowledge also includes working through numerous issues to include language 
barriers, cross cultural communication context, foreign disclosure challenges, dissimilar 
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equipment issues, cultural differences, specialized roles in the security effort, and different 
infrastructure baseline (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013, p. 47).  
Training is essential to achieving America’s desired security goals. Pirone (2010) 
conducts an in-depth study regarding SFA. He states, “it is becoming increasingly 
important for the U.S. to assist its allies in developing the capability to be responsible for 
their own actions” (p. 1). He examines U.S. assistance to El Salvador from 1980–1992, 
and the U.S. assistance to the Philippines from 2002–present, and compares them to U.S. 
security force assistance to Afghanistan.  
One point that Pirone helped to clarify was the difference between FID and SFA. 
Joint Publication 1-02 defines FID as, “Participation by civilian and military agencies of 
a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security” (Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2010, p. 326). SOF is usually assigned the FID mission because FID is internally 
focused. Joint Publication 1-02 defines SFA as, “The Department of Defense activities 
that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of 
the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (p. 
145). SFA traditionally was a SOF mission, but due to the excessive numbers of 
personnel required to conduct SFA, many general purpose forces are now training to 
conduct the SFA mission, while SOF remains the lead. 
Pirone’s recommendations clearly defined goals and objectives through training 
to develop PN security capabilities. Once a clear goal and objective is defined, then a 
unity of effort needs to happen. Everyone must work together to achieve the goal. He 
argued that to achieve these goals, the most important factor is the selection and 
qualification of the advisor. “The individual advisor, having the most direct contact with 
partner nation personnel and units, is perhaps the most important factor in any U.S. 
assistance effort” (Pirone, 2010, p. 75). PN interaction is critical to the success of the 
goals and advisors are in constant and direct contact.  
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2. Doctrine 
Marine Corps commanders train their troops vigorously based on the doctrine 
they have at their disposal. Warfighting functions provide standard operating procedures 
(SOP) for commanders to train to a common core.  
 a. Advisor 2.0: Advancing the Military Transition Team Model by Jones 
Military doctrine is the basis for all training conducted by the U.S. military. Major 
Jones’ study (2008), Advisor 2.0: Advancing the Military Transition Team Model, 
examined the battalion level advisor teams, and how their organization, training, and 
education identify that teams are insufficient to meet operational requirements. These 
battalion teams are a subset of the old USMC MTT. He argues that the USMC identifies 
MTTs months in advance of deploying while some battalion FSF advisor teams are not 
identified until they are in country. The battalion teams train according to the warfighting 
functions of maneuver, logistics, and force protection, however, and not on advising or 
engagement. Once in country, the battalion teams are unprepared to train and advise 
foreign units.  
Major Jones concludes, “in the current counterinsurgency fight, or future full-
scale conventional operations, the USMC MTT requires effective organization, 
education, and training” (Jones, 2008, p. ii). Battalion teams must be identified early and 
organized prior to deployment and allowed to train as a team for the mission. If a team 
has, “the proper organization, and solid academics, the training schedule balanced 
between combat skills and advising theory will produce the most effective USMC MTT” 
(p. 13). If the teams train only to the six warfighting functions, the teams have a majority 
of the combat training required. Commanders must educate their Marines on engagement; 
however, no Marine Corps training manual on engagement operations exists. 
 b. Afghanistan 2012 and Beyond: Clearing, Holding, and Building with 
Transition Teams by Tryon 
Having a doctrine is not good enough; it must be followed to achieve uniformity 
for all Marines. Major Tryon’s (2012) study stated, “political and military leadership 
[need to] to follow doctrine and allow Military Transition Teams to finish the COIN 
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campaign” (p. i). He outlines that Field Manual (FM 3-24) Counterinsurgency is the right 
manual to transition governance and security to the Afghan people (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2014a). When Major Tyron wrote his thesis, the United States 
operated for two years after establishing a self-imposed exit date for all U.S. forces to 
redeploy. Major Tyron also used arguments from high-ranking political figures who 
claimed that counterinsurgency (COIN) was not working. He claimed that COIN was a 
difficult and timely undertaking and that everyone must work together to route the 
insurgency.  
Major Tyron feels the United States has a good doctrine but is executing it poorly. 
Tyron (2012) states, “the current COIN strategy has three problems: lack of Afghan 
support, failure of the U.S. to follow its own doctrine, and degrading support for the war 
itself” (p. 10). He added that four problems prevented training teams from being 
effective: ineffectiveness of personnel selection, fatigue, misuse by ground commanders, 
and a training curriculum not designed for an illiterate soldier.  
Major Tyron concluded (2012) that the United States must reduce the large 
military footprint and focus on the MiTT, which allows for the transition in Afghanistan. 
“Military Transition Teams with the proper structure of personnel, operating at the 
battalion level and above with a focus on technical skills and building a professional 
army, are the best hope for a smooth transition” (p. 20). He claims that FM 3-24, if 
followed, provides the right course of action to win. The key to success is the HN, and 
with MiTT assistance, they must fight the battles.  
3. Manning  
The studies in this section identify the need to improve manning advisor teams. 
These documents have identified shortfalls related to the Marine Corps selection of 
Marines to fill billets on advisor teams. Developing the right manpower through HRDP is 
essential for the successful deployment of advisor teams. Marines need the appropriate 
rank, MOS proficiency, age, gender, maturity/patience, availability, specific experience, 
instructor background, temperament, language skills, and regional expertise, along with 
many other qualifications to succeed as an advisor. 
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 a. Personnel Sourcing for Transition Teams by Saunders 
The Marine Corps is manning teams in several different ways. Most teams are 
staffed internal to units that have received tasking for SC related missions. For other 
tasks, Marines are stripped from existing units, and are unprepared and inexperienced to 
execute the defense strategy. Saunders (2008) writes about personnel sourcing for 
transition teams and how the Marine Corps sources manpower for transition teams. After 
introducing the transition team basics she states, “there is no standing Marine unit that 
supplies personnel to all transition teams so personnel must be sourced from existing 
Marine units” (p. 3). She spoke about how the transition teams were the main effort in 
2008. She also discusses how the Marine Corps takes majors from critical billets within a 
combat arms battalion. A major fills one of two billets, an executive or operations officer. 
Both are critical to the battalion and cause the battalion commanders to fill the vacancies 
with junior company grade officers. Saunders (2008) explains how the Marine Corps 
takes Marines from different units to form teams and usually they are, “unprepared, 
unwillingly, and with insufficient time to train properly before deployment” (p. 6). The 
FSF advisor teams have, and hold, a vital mission for years to come. For this reason, 
manning is crucial to the success of the mission.  
Saunders (2008) concluded that the exit strategy for Iraq was the proper transfer 
of security from the coalition forces to the Iraqi security forces. She stated that everyone, 
from the President to the battalion commanders, supported this exit strategy. However, 
the Marine Corps selected its teams based on “availability vice qualifications” (p. 8). The 
Marine Corps is not organized with dedicated advisor units from which to pull. The 
Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA) and Manpower Management 
Enlisted Assignments (MMEA) divisions do not assign Marines to advisor units; they are 
usually sourced via IA process. The usual tools and mechanics to assign Marines are 
methodical and institutional, and are slow to change. She identified that embedding with 
foreign military was a demanding task, which required a well-manned and trained unit 
that could work together as a team. The training at the time did not meet the mission. 
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 b. Selection of Military Advisors by Clark 
Not everyone is suited to interact with foreign militaries; therefore, the selection 
of individual team members for FSF advisor teams is directly related to advising success. 
Clark (2007) conducted a thorough study on manning transition teams. His focus and 
analysis was on Army teams for Iraq. He argued that the selection of advisory personnel 
is critical for successful advising. His historical background is a review from the time of 
T. L. Lawrence to Vietnam era. Due to the harsh environment of living, working, and 
fighting with PN, he argues that some service members are “better suited than others to 
such austere and often ambiguous environments” (p. v). He believed that the Army 
should develop selection criteria for the U.S. military personnel to achieve prior to 
becoming a team member. Once selected, the Army can assess the individuals through 
the training and team formation to determine their match for the team. 
Clark (2007) concluded that “the lost lessons of Vietnam seem particularly 
haunting in light of the mission in Iraq” (p. 67). Thirty years of lessons have been 
“forgotten in the files of history” (p. 67). It seems as if the military is trying to regain its 
proficiency. He also argued that selected U.S. personnel need better training, because 
without training, military forces are ineffective. The results indicate that screening and 
selecting of the best people to man the training team produce a higher level of success. 
While “selection, preparation, and employment” (p. 68) is important, collecting the 
positive and negative feedback is just as important. The data must continue to be 
collected to ensure the future success of the teams.  
 c. Conclusion 
These studies on advising, speak directly to training, doctrine, and manning. The 
common theme of these studies identified a need for specific skill sets to achieve success 
on a FSF advisor team. All the studies revealed that training was very important and 
quality team training was needed prior to deployment to allow for the maximum 
utilization during the deployment. Some of the studies focused on military doctrine. 
Whether doctrine existed and was not used, or something is being missed, doctrine is 
essential to keep everyone operating on the same page. Manpower is the number one 
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contributing factor to the overall success of a team, whether its selection criteria, 
qualifications, or personnel, they have to be able to operate in small teams. Regardless of 
the personnel selected without the proper doctrine or training, the team never reaches the 
mission objectives. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Together, the national strategies and policies and related studies provide a deeper 
understanding of how engagement through advising builds partner capacity. A national 
directive review is not enough to understand engagement; previous studies provide 
scholars’ views on engagement and suggest how to achieve America’s national interests. 
These directives and studies established the framework of training, doctrine, and 
manning, which are used to conduct a fluid analysis.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
An advisor is an implanter of information and ideas. All other 
considerations must be subordinated to this purpose. An advisor is a 
mature, dedicated individual who exercises patience and perseverance in 
accomplishing his mission. An advisor is an individual who does not 
attempt to Americanize everyone he meets; rather he helps people make of 
themselves what they want, not what the advisor wants.  
—Major Irving C. Huldin 
 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have greatly increased the need for the U.S. 
military to employ small teams to conduct security force assistance missions. These 
operations are not only restricted to combat zones. Regional theater security cooperation 
plans have evolved requiring an increase of FSF teams to support the building of partner 
capacity, security, and stability in identified countries. This chapter analyzes the current 
training, doctrine, and manning practices used by the Marine Corps and provides ideas to 
improve the Marine Corps’ security force assistance training and doctrine in the post-Iraq 
and Afghanistan era. 
A. FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TEAM TRAINING 
The MCSCG currently provides training and support to Marine Corps missions. 
One of MCSCG’s missions is to provide advisor training to Marines deploying to 
conduct security force assistance. Appendix B presents a description of the MCSCG 
established BAC consisting of 39 classes ranging from introduction to advising through 
to a scenario-based assessment of advising skills. The BAC is designed to provide 
students with the basic knowledge needed to be successful during an advising tour. The 
course is a three-week evolution, which awards the 0570 MOS for officers and 0571 for 
enlisted Marines. According to Marine Corps Order 1200.17E, the Military Occupational 
Specialties Manual, a free MOS is not a primary MOS that any Marine can obtain and is 
not related to their primary MOS (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2013, p. x). 
The course is held at the MCSCG facilities in Fort Story, Virginia. Additionally, MTTs 
can provide limited elements of the BAC to commands that will fund the training.  
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MCSCG is currently redesigning the advisor courses. The redesigned training 
aims to implement new education and standardize the FSF advisor teams. Additionally, 
the goal is to ensure that pre-deployment training supports the myriad of security force 
assistance missions that may develop. The new advisor training objective is to help 
advisor teams to problem solve creatively in a variety of ambiguous environments. A 
combination of prescriptive training and developmental education should serve as the 
core of the BAC permitting “shared understanding, and spread [the] best practices 
throughout a counterinsurgency community” for either civilian, military, and non-
government personnel (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 7). An example of the new training is learning 
to assess the literacy of a partner force. If the force cannot read, then the program of 
instruction will need to be significantly adjusted. In Afghanistan, the overall literacy rate 
for males aged 15 and older is 43.1 percent, while the female rate is 12.6 percent (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2015, p. 3). These rates pose a challenge for FSF teams that plan to 
share written documents to support mission execution when only 43 percent of the 
partner force can read. Therefore, it is a truism that “inbound Brigade Combat Teams and 
Division Headquarters should understand the operational environment and prepare now 
for combined team embedded partnership operations” (Grigsby Jr. & Pendall, 2010, p. 
10). Developing an understanding of the operational environment starts with the pre-
deployment training and the follow-on assessment for the FSF mission. In this case, just 
testing the literacy of the partner force may help shape the teaching techniques the team 
can use to achieve the training objectives, and in turn, allow the follow-on team to 
continue to improve on the previous team’s efforts.  
In an article for the Small Wars Journal, Colonel Grigsby and Lieutenant Colonel 
Pendall (2010) stated, “pre-deployment combat training centers in the U.S. and NATO 
Sponsored mission preparatory exercises are well-suited to provide context and current 
operational frameworks to refine processes and procedures for integrating staffs with 
combined team approaches toward the mission” (p. 10). The difference between training 
and educating is that training is for the known environment and educating is for the 
unknown environment. For example, training is conducted for conventional warfare 
fought on a field with fixed rules and objectives. The tactics change, but the environment 
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remains the same and is known. Conversely, education is employed for asymmetric 
warfare, which has no rules, no court, no uniform, and no prescribed tools and is 
unknown. Marines need to be taught what has worked in the past and should not have to 
relearn this information while conducting the mission. 
To conduct the required training, the Marine Corps must invest manpower hours 
and resource material to train Marines in advising operations. The total manpower cost 
for the MCSCG to hold one BAC is $117,755.35. Annually, for 10 BAC courses, the 
Marine Corps will incur a manpower cost of $1,177,553.50, as shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  Annual BAC Costs 
 
BAC Costs 
  Cost of 18 persons to deliver 10  
three-week Basic Advisor course 
  Instructors per delivery 18 
course deliveries per FY 10 
Students per class 25 
Cost per Marine $4,710.21  
FY15 MPMC Composite Rate $117,755.35  
Annual cost $1,177,553.48  
 
 
Calculations for the three–week course were derived from the DOD regular 
military compensation (RMC) calculator (“Regular Military Compensation Calculator,” 
2015), as shown in Appendix D, which provides an annual salary. The annual salary was 
then converted to an average monthly pay of the ranks in the MCSCG training instructor 
group (TIG). The MCSCG T/O lists 24 Marines in the TIG. Five Marines can be 
removed to account for leadership and administration, which leaves 18 Marines to 
instruct the BAC course. Not calculated is the time necessary for the Marines to become 
proficient in instructing the course. The average monthly pay—to include base pay, basic 
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allowance for subsistence (BAS), basic allowance for housing (BAH) located in the 
continental United States (CONUS), and tax advantage of all the ranks in the TIG—is 
shown in Appendix D and consolidated in Table 2. The T/O indicates that four sergeants, 
six staff sergeants, six gunnery sergeants, and two majors make up the training instructor 
cadre and cost $83,824.46 to provide one, three-week BAC. Together, with the 
$33,930.89 in administrative costs, the total cost to provide one BAC is $117,755.35. 
According to the establishment of a MCSCG message dated October 4, 2011, the average 
class size was approximately 25 students, which resulted in a cost of $4,710.21 per 
student over the three-week period. 
















E5 $4,570.44  $1,142.61  $3,427.83  $13,711.32  $6,855.66  
E6 $5,731.60  $1,432.90  $4,298.70  $25,792.20   
E7 $6,470.34  $1,617.59  $4,852.76  $29,116.53   
E8 $7,126.21  $1,781.55  $5,344.66   $10,689.32  
      
O4 $10,136.27  $2,534.07  $7,602.20  $15,204.41  $7,602.20  
O5 $11,711.62  $2,927.91  $8,783.72   $8,783.72  
   Total $83,824.46  $33,930.89 
      
   Total course cost  $117,755.35 
 
 
The BAC is one small element of the TIG, which is a section under MCSCG. 
Another section within MCSCG has six regional sections called CLATT that work with 
geographic combatant commanders (GCC), component commanders for the Marine 
Forces (MARFOR), and HN to develop security cooperation engagement plans (SCEPs). 
Each regionally aligned MARFOR develops and implements a SCEP in support of its 
respective GCC. SCEPs are typically three- to five-year plans designed to prioritize SC 
efforts to meet theater objectives, such as building partner capacity, enhancing 
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interoperability, assuring access, and maintaining military-to-military relationships. In 
turn, these objectives are then translated into actionable training packages executed by 
appropriately tasked MEFs, allowing the FSF advisor teams to know what has been done 
prior to their arrival and to shape future efforts. A graphical representation of how FSF 
advisor teams work together to achieve success is shown in Figure 3, which is read 
counterclockwise from the top. As the teams deploy, each partner force is assessed 
counter clockwise from red to yellow and becomes green once it has achieved mastery of 
the objectives.  
Figure 3.  Security Cooperation Engagement Plan Cycle 
 
 
Due to the SCEP, FSF advisor teams are able to develop a better understanding of 
long-term objectives and how the team’s efforts, in the short term, will fit into the larger 
security cooperation plan for a given region or country. The SCEP also allows the FSF 
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advisor teams to support the partner forces continuously to become mission capable. 
Important to this effort is an assessment of the desired security role for the partner force, 
as each situation will require a tailored training package. In some cases, the FSF may not 
need to conduct combat operations, and therefore, the training effort may be less resource 
intensive. If the country-specific program requires multiple deployment iterations, then 
assessment from rotation to rotation is vital to ensure steady progress. Otherwise, teams 
do not know what was done in the past as “few military units we encountered had any 
visibility on events in their battlespace more than 18 months in the past” (Barno, 2011, p. 
7). Before the SCEP was implemented, no continuity existed between FSF teams across 
rotations. In some cases, this challenge led to FSF advisor teams determining what to 
train their partner forces on after arrival in country. Originating with a request for forces 
(RFF) from MARFORCOM, parent commands form FSF advisor teams to conduct 
specified missions in support of the GCC’s TSCP. Since SCEPs are an independent effort 
to shape SC efforts in a country, the regionally-aligned CLATT works with the newly 
assigned FSF advisor team to create a training plan tailored to fit the team’s needs to 
achieve success. Additionally, the team leader reviews the records of the new team to 
determine deficiencies in the Marine annual training and calculates what is required to 
meet the Marine Corps pre-deployment training program (PTP), which includes a series 
of classes, ranges, and drills that each GCC requires prior to anyone arriving in theater. A 
sample timeline of what the FSF advisor teams may need to accomplish for training prior 
to deployment is shown in Figure 4. In support of the actual FSF mission, most teams 
must conduct an initial, mid, and final planning conference (FPC) (initial planning 
conference (IPC), mid planning conference (MPC), and FPC). Depending on the length 
of the deployment, the team must also consider pre-deployment leave, additional 
language training, foreign weapons, advanced driving, or high-risk concealed carry 
training. Regardless of the requirement, the training must be completed prior to the 
mission rehearsal exercise (MRX), which allows for a complete evaluation of the team 
prior to deploying.  
  
 41 
Figure 4.  Sample FSF Advisor Team Training Plan 
 
 
Thirty-nine classes on advising are offered during the BAC; however, eight 
classes are also tied to annual training requirements and could be taught through the 
parent command. The S-2 Intelligence section could teach classes on the controlled 
release of information, the law of war and the rules of engagement, legal considerations 
in an SC environment, counter elicitation, and surveillance awareness. The S-3 operations 
section could teach limited instructional delivery methods and range operations. 
Together, these classes account for 24 hours or three days of training, which helps to 
reduce the overall course length. It is assumed that each unit can provide a standardized 
period of instruction and thus, incorporates lessons learned and a consistent level of 
instruction that the MCSCG is providing. Additionally, parent unit training also 
maintains the expectation of performance between the FSF advisor teams and the home 
station organization.  
The BAC provides a foundation for every advising action that a team member is 
likely to implement while deployed and in a forum that allows the team to receive all the 
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required classes at one time. This tactic prevents the material from being diluted across 
the pre-deployment schedule, which could cause further gaps and conflicts in training. 
Additionally, once a class is completed, students are asked to fill out an instructional 
rating form provided in Appendix C. These forms are filled out to be used by the 
instructors to improve their delivery and the class itself. Upon completion of the BAC, 
students fill out an end of course critique provided in Appendix F. This form affords 
students the opportunity to submit an assessment of the course as a whole to help the unit 
improve. 
To cultivate the process of BAC feedback, MCSCG could formally use the 
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to support gathering and cataloging 
not only BAC feedback, but more importantly, post-deployment FSF team AARs. This 
support would improve the continuity of lessons learned between FSF advisor teams 
serving in the same location.  
Beyond the BAC, typical FSF advisor team training models are cluttered with 
additional training requirements that may not be appropriate for all deployments. For 
example, Figure 4 emphasizes blocks of instruction on foreign weapons, advanced 
driving, and High Risk (HR) concealed carry. What if a specific mission does not require 
training on foreign weapons or if force protection firearms are not authorize in the HN? 
These scenarios would drastically change the pre-deployment training for a given FSF 
advisor team. Once teams are identified for a specific mission, the train-up model should 
be tailored accordingly to ensure that the limited training time available is not squandered 
on erroneous events.  
Additionally, Figure 4 illustrates a gross shortcoming in FSF advisor team 
preparation. The schedule of events does not account for actual mission preparation. This 
sample assumes the FSF advisor team is already competent on all the skills it will impart 
on a foreign military in a foreign language. For those who have conducted training 
missions as short as a few weeks, program of instruction (POI) preparation is essential to 
ensure the actual mission of the FSF advisor team is successful. Such preparations 
include POI development, translation of the POI, collection of key materials, such as 
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teaching aids, and of course, detailed rehearsals of the various classes. Most FSF teams 
have captured these experiences in AARs upon returning from deployment. 
The MCCLL was established to become a repository for all AARs. This 
organization has helped deploying units gather insight on the challenges previous units 
faced while deployed. Every AAR collects best tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) and specific items of interest for the deployed unit and is stored for future use. It 
does not provide for a statistical analysis of the course to determine which classes add 
value prior to deployment. Only a survey designed to collect general information and 
specific numerical ratings on each class determines if that class is statistically significant.  
The current course provided by the MCSCG encourages informal reach-back, but 
it does not offer Marines a formal or systematic option for providing feedback after they 
have deployed. The MCSCG is receptive and interested in informal reach-back and 
follow-up. The classroom offers students the theoretical concepts that have been 
developed, molded, and formed from past experiences. The deployment provides the 
students the ability to implement those concepts by applying them in the daily 
performance of their duty. These concepts are modified, reshaped, and tested to provide 
an improved product that works during deployment. Taking ideas from concepts in the 
classroom and developing them into general guidelines, Marines have a unique 
opportunity to provide criticism to field-tested concepts, which offers insight into the 
ever-evolving battlefield. 
The Marine Corps’ manual discusses how to develop classes from idea to delivery 
but has no system in place to incorporate AARs or lessons learned. The systems approach 
to train (SAT) manual dated June 2004 provides the MCSCG both the instructional rating 
form (Appendix C) and end of course critique form (Appendix E) to evaluate instruction. 
The purpose of this manual is to help develop, analyze, and improve teaching. While the 
manual does a great job detailing what is needed to conduct the teaching, it does not 
include a process to evaluate AAR and lessons learned to improve on the training. As is, 
no mechanism is available to determine the impact of the basic advisor course classes 
once a unit comes back from its mission. 
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B. FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TEAM DOCTRINE 
The Marine Corps has a comprehensive doctrinal system established for 
warfighting functions. Currently, the Marine Corps has 10 MCDP to address the major 
warfighting activities. According to Marine Corps Bulletin 5600 dated December 8, 
2010, Marine Corps service doctrine consists of publications created to describe the 
warfighting TTP of the Marine Corps located in Table 3. This doctrine details the 
fundamental principles that guide Marine Corps forces to perform assigned missions. The 
MCDP provides commanders the tools necessary to conduct planning and operations. 
However, none of the publications equip commanders with the knowledge to conduct 
security force assistance missions.  
Table 3.   List of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications 
MCDP 1 WARFIGHTING 
MCDP 1-0 MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS 
MCDP 1-1 STRATEGY 
MCDP 1-2 CAMPAIGNING 
MCDP 1-3 TACTICS 
MCDP 2 INTELLIGENCE 
MCDP 3 EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS 
MCDP 4 LOGISTICS 
MCDP 5 PLANNING 
MCDP 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL 
 
 
Incoming Marine Corps FSF advisor teams are forced to adjust to different 
requirements as the new team arrives into a deployment with limited knowledge of what 
current teams are currently executing. SC is a long process that takes time and will span 
numerous teams. FSF teams must know where they are in the SCEP, which will 
determine the team’s training priorities. Therefore, new teams not only need to know 
what the previous team has done, they must know what all the teams before them have 
accomplished. With no doctrine, FSF teams are placed in a situation in which “we 
continually forget, relearn, discard our corporate knowledge” (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 1). 
Without doctrine, FSF teams that have completed their deployment and conduct turnover 
with a new FSF team may have a different focus, which reduces the previous team’s 
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accomplishments. Outgoing teams face frustration as they “spend 12 months rolling the 
boulder up the hill only to see it roll back to the bottom when they go home” (Barno, 
2011, p. 7). A common endstate must exist that every FSF team understands, as well as 
where they fit in to accomplish that endstate.  
Commanders typically initiate Marine Corps training as a result of assigned 
missions they receive through external orders and directives. The MCDP doctrinal series 
covers the requirements for MAGTFs to conduct tactical level operations. However, the 
FSF advisor teams spend a majority of their time while deployed in mentoring and 
advising roles in conjunction with tactical operations. Therefore, the current MCDP 
series experiences two main shortfalls. First, no doctrinal foundation for the Marine 
Corps is available to follow to integrate security force assistance under the guidelines of 
MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. The MCDP 1-0 discusses the six phases of 
military operations, which include shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, 
and enable civil authority. Phase 0 is to shape, which builds friendly relationships. Phase 
1 is to deter without force to pursue U.S. interests. Phase 2 is to seize the initiative with 
the start of combat power. Phase 3 is to dominate the enemy by destroying them. Phase 4 
is to stabilize and initiates the beginning of reconstruction. Phase 5 enables the local civil 
authority to assume control as the legitimate governing body. MCDP 1-0 does discuss 
limited terms of SC, SA, and sustainment operations, however, not once does it provide 
guidance to commanders on how to conduct mentoring and advising.  
Secondly, it is unclear if the tasks and standards codified in the MCDP series are 
appropriate to actually developing foreign security forces. Aside from training a partner 
force on specified skills, the standards and expectation of the training are also important 
considerations. How can Marine FSF teams train and develop partner forces to a realistic 
standard if the doctrinal foundation is not scalable for security forces in developing states 
to actually build and sustain identified capabilities? Simply, if the Marine Corps is 
serious about developing a FSF training capability, realistic doctrine that covers training 
and operational standards is needed.  
When Marines go to the field, it is common practice to conduct offensive and 
defensive drills. A platoon conducts a raid through another platoon’s lines and then 
 46 
consolidates and prepares for the counter attack. The point is that units typically stop to 
conduct an after-action of the effectiveness of the attack and defense. The crux of the 
problem is that the training has always stopped short of completing the cycle of the six 
phases of military operations.  
The Marine Corps trains continually up to phase three but fails to take the time to 
even discuss or train the final two phases of the operation. Little time is allocated to build 
engagement skills with the collapsed country, which is in need of help to rebuild what 
was destroyed. Marines train to fight; however, they do not receive the education to 
engage, repair, and rebuild. The Marine Corps’ six warfighting functions provide 
strategic level doctrine on what is required; however, it falls short on teaching the 
necessities to return a country to an actively producing member of the world community. 
The Marine Corps’ lack of doctrine also creates confusion in conducting the FSF 
training mission. Teams must have a source document that establishes objectives that 
allow them to train as a team to an understood standard of performance and then be able 
to operate in a manner that will in turn fulfill the expectations of the command that 
assigned the mission. Additionally, an effective security force assistance doctrine will 
also aid in linking the efforts of successive Marine FSF team rotations conducting the 
same mission.  
Although the Marine Corps currently lacks any institutionalized doctrine on this 
niche subject, U.S. military resources do exist on which the Marine Corps could build. The 
U.S. Army identified a similar shortfall and created a functional concept to address 
engagement. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has created a 
TRADOC pamphlet (TP) 525-8-5. The pamphlet, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for 
Engagement, could help address the Marine Corps’ lack of a capstone doctrine that 
addresses all the concepts and address the non-coercive elements of applying military 
power. Coupled with this document, the Army also has the FM 3-07-1: Security Force 
Assistance, which serves as a practical team-level doctrinal resource for all elements of 
executing security force assistance. As an interactive resource, the J7-Joint Force 
Development of the Joint Staff has also established the Joint Center for International 
Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, KS to serve as a the Center of Excellence 
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for Security Force Assistance. The purpose is to directly support warfighting, doctrine 
development, and operating force requirements and to address SFA challenges through 
analysis and research (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2015, p. 1).  
With these resources, Marine Corps commanders have the ability to include 
security force assistance and general engagement training into their annual training plans. 
Institutionally, the Marine Corps at large can build on these resources to train on what 
capabilities and skills are needed to support foreign security force partners. Without a 
doctrinal foundation, deploying units will not have the ability to develop and later access 
lessons learned. Furthermore, an institutionalized doctrine will enable the Marine Corps 
to prepare capabilities and skills and forecast the time needed to develop well-prepared 
FSF advisor teams.  
C. FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TEAM MANNING  
Once standards for doctrine and training are established, it is essential to select the 
most capable Marines to execute security force assistance missions. No doubt exists that 
“each player must understand the others’ strength, weakness, capabilities and objectives, 
and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide 
variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks)” 
(Kilcullen, 2006, p. 4). Advising is a fluid and ever-changing process because the 
enemies are evolving their TTP to counter America’s transformations. Teams must be 
developed with the mission in mind to achieve the desired end state. Teams are small and 
have limited manpower resources; therefore, teams must have members with diverse 
backgrounds and not individuals who are masters in a specific area. Time must be spent 
selecting the right individuals that fit each the team.  
The Marine Corps has many capable Marines, but not everyone is suited for 
advising. Therefore, the Marine Corps must find the right people who can execute 
difficult tasks in difficult environments. Advisors must be great communicators, have 
patience and maturity, and have the ability to negotiate, all the while advising in a non-
judgmental way. Advisors should have a basic understanding of the language and culture. 
If they have experience in the region, an understanding of SA, and a high level of MOS 
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proficiency, then they possess the unique qualities for joining a team. Advisors have to 
perform in the absence of direct supervision and must have the ability “to rapidly develop 
and learn new techniques and apply them in a fast-moving, high-threat environment, 
bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in response, and rapidly changing 
them as the environment shifts” (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 2). Simply, Marines need to be able 
to think on their feet in a fast-changing environment.  
The Marine Corps not only needs to find capable Marines, but it must also find 
leaders who can provide mentorship to other Marines, as well as to the foreign military 
leaders. In his congressional testimony, LtGen(Ret.) Barno (2011) stated that American 
leadership needs to be reasserted and that “success [requires] ‘Leadership plus Strategy 
plus Resources’” (p. 1). Marine advisors need to be very competent at many skills to 
teach FSF through an interpreter. Advisors must inspire FSF leaders to lead from the 
front to help establish them as credible leaders ready to fight for their own interests.  
For the last decade, the Marine Corps has sacrificed the readiness of its unit to 
deploy FSF advisor teams. The GCC understand that they must organize “major parts of 
the remaining U.S. force more clearly toward the ‘Advise and Assist’ mission sooner, not 
later” (Barno, 2011, p. 4). Currently, the GCC requires that teams engage with countries 
in their area of responsibility (AOR). This requirement is sent to the Joint Staff for action, 
and eventually, to the services to be sourced. U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command 
(MARFORCOM) is responsible for sourcing the requirement. One method used to source 
FSF advisor teams is to use the IA program. The team members are taken individually 
from the operating and supporting establishment. This method ignores unit cohesion and 
focuses only on filling the individual team member requirement. This technique forces 
individuals to come together as teams and foster esprit de corps with limited time and 
little recourse if individuals do not fit into the team. 
Individually augmenting is a process the Marine Corps uses to fill individuals 
versus unit manpower requirements. The requirements may necessitate a Marine with a 
special skill or capability, usually in a specific rank. The Joint Manning Document (JMD) 
is made up of lines of requests; usually, an individual fills a line number known as a 
requirement tracking number (RTN). Within the line is the information describing the 
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task the Marine will be assigned. Some of the included information is rank, MOS, job 
description, duration, and location. The manpower requirements tracking module 
monitors the sourcing for the JMD. This module fills the request using limited factors and 
does not account for the specific job and team dynamics. 
The IA requirement filters down to the battalions and commanders, who are 
forced to task people without a complete understanding of the team’s needs. While 
Marines are filling the IA, they are accounted for on their parent unit command, yet the 
commander of the parent unit cannot request another person to backfill the billet. For 
example, a battalion is tasked with filling the team leader billet, usually an O-4 major. In 
most cases, a battalion only has two or three majors, an executive officer, operations 
officer, and sometimes, the commanding officer of a weapons company. Therefore, the 
parent unit’s on-hand strength is depleted by 33–50 percent for that unit, which creates 
large gaps in the commands without the ability to backfill. One possible remedy could be 
to assign an inbound O-4 who is between tours to fill the requirement. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Warfare has evolved since the first battle between men. Today, small teams 
conducting security force assistance can be the vehicle that allows nations to remain 
peaceful and helps limit escalation to full-scale warfare. History has shown that once the 
fighting is done, power vacuums will develop if the victor remains inactive. Time must 
be invested into the people of the fallen nation to allow them to stand up and become 
productive members of their society. Building partner capacity, security, and stability is 
in the best interest of every nation. The key is providing FSF teams with the training, 
doctrine, and manning practices that encourage them to take the necessary time to 
achieve the desired endstate once the battle is over. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This study analyzes the Marine Corps training, doctrine, and manning for FSF 
advisor teams. A multitude of laws, acts, and national strategies cumulatively explain the 
origins of the requirements for FSF advisor teams. The HRDP is how the Marine Corps 
identifies requirements and funds, accesses, and develops the free MOS assigned at the 
completion of training by the MCSCG. HRDP supports the FSF advisor team in 
delivering the right person with the right skills, in the right place, at the right time, to 
achieve the desired deployment readiness outcome.  
This FSF advisor team mission is essential to the execution of the U.S.’ national 
and military strategies, and time must be spent providing comprehensive training. This 
training is among the most important tasks assigned to the Marine Corps today. MCSCG 
indicated that the training requires a minimum of 17 instructors to accommodate one 
BAC. The instructor cost for one three-week BAC, consisting of 39 advising classes, is 
approximately $118,000. While all the instructors are not needed at every class, some 
classes, such as the practical application classes, need more instructors to facilitate the 
training. SC is not a trait that comes naturally to an individual; therefore, an investment in 
training will exponentially increase the probability of mission success.  
Once pre-deployment and BAC training is complete, the FSF teams are expected 
to perform the mission of advising through engagement. However, the Marine Corps 
lacks specific doctrine in a uniform document that explains how to integrate SC. This 
void will likely reduce the impact of any training program due to the lack of resident 
knowledge regarding SC.  
The final key to the triad is the proper manning of the FSF teams. SC requires 
cohesive teams able to work through many challenges associated with advising. Cohesion 
is a term used to explain how well a group of individuals come together as a team. 
However, the manner by which FSF requirements were filled in the past came with a 
significant cost to the parent unit’s personnel inventory. Moreover, the current training 
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pipeline lacks sufficient time to create FSF team cohesion among the newly formed 
teams. Therefore, the following conclusions and recommendations are provided in 
support of improving the training, doctrine, and manning essential to successful 
deployment execution.  
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After conducting an analysis of historical and current practices, this thesis 
provides the following answers to the questions outlined in Chapter I.  
1. Primary Question 
Based on historical Marine Corps engagements and partnerships, what 
fundamental skills should be taught in the Basic Marine Advisor Course? 
 a. Conclusion  
SC training directly supports the goals of America’s security strategy. An analysis 
of the literature suggests that conducting SC classes more frequently provides for better 
unit cohesion because personnel are assigned from various units using a variety of 
standards. In addition, individual units lack access to the MCSCG’s lessons learned and 
AARs to update training on a regular basis. To estimate the impact of each class within 
the BAC, specific data must be collected to form a relationship between a class and the 
mission. When MCSCG has well-defined goals and objectives that the rest of the Marine 
Corps understands, training can help develop PN, while meeting America’s national 
security objectives. Currently, MCSCG lacks data, and the collection of the right data 
could determine if classes should remain in the curriculum. While the course objectives 
have been written and rewritten from lessons learned post-deployment, an instrument, 
such as a survey, has never been used in conjunction with the BAC classes. That data 
would provide direct input from returning teams on what classes to delete, expand, or 
maintain.  
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 b. Recommendations 
The MCSCG should implement the post-deployment survey developed by this 
research. The sample survey provided in Appendix F could serve as a strawman. This 
survey has not been beta tested or submitted through an Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
process. The survey draws a comparison between general class information and team 
member shortfalls. An analysis of the survey data will yield the required information to 
determine the value of each class to the training teams. 
2. Secondary Question 1 
What Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication Is Needed to Assure Continued Success 
with Engagement? 
 a. Conclusions 
The research could not find any Marine Corps order (MCO) or directive that 
instructs commanders on how to train Marines for engagement operations. The Marine 
Corps doctrinal publications cover combat operations, but nothing could be found that 
addresses TTPs for engagement or the six phases of military operations. Military 
engagement can begin anywhere within the six phases and sometimes happens 
concurrently. The Marine Corps has mastered phases two (seize the initiative) and three 
(dominate) during training; however, when a unit goes to the field to conduct field 
exercises, training stops once a unit assaults through the objective. This stoppage is 
problematic because once your assault ends and the unit consolidates, which ends phase 
three, two more phases need to be conducted. Phases four (stabilize) and five (enable 
civil authority) are not perfected during training, yet they are vital to conduct turnover 
with the local authorities and to end America’s role in the conflict. Returning the 
countries involved to phase zero (shaping) will help rebuild relationships. 
 b. Recommendations 
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) should create a 
Marine Corps doctrinal publication for engagement. Currently, the U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has created a TRADOC pamphlet (TP) 525-8-5. The 
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pamphlet, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, could provide the Marine 
Corps with the necessary framework to create such a directive. The new Marine Corps 
directive would also allow commanders to include engagement in an annual training plan 
for all Marines and to institutionalize training on what capabilities and skills are needed 
to support HN, regional partners, and indigenous peoples.  
3. Secondary Question 2 
How Should Marines be assigned to Foreign Security Force Teams? 
 a. Conclusions 
The current process of manning FSF advisor teams through IA may have a 
detrimental effect on the parent unit. While an IA responds to a priority-tasking 
requirement on a FSF advisor team, that individual’s parent unit is left with a limited 
number of personnel by rank and MOS. Moreover, when units are tasked with sending a 
key billet holder on an IA, it may adversely affect the unit’s cohesion, which is a well-
established component of readiness. In addition, unit cohesion for a newly formed FSF 
team is not immediate. This cohesion takes time. While the parent unit’s cohesion is torn 
apart, the new FSF team is thrown together, and if insufficient time is given prior to 
deployment, then the FSF advisor team’s readiness is affected.  
 b. Recommendations 
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps should follow suit with the Navy’s 
NAVADMIN 147/07, which establishes a procedure for filling teams through the 
equivalent of a Marine Corps monitor. The methodology used by the Navy through the 
NAVADMIN, Global War on Terror Support Assignment (GSA), the Marine Corps will 
contribute to improved readiness through unit cohesion and work-life balance. Monitors 
fill FSF advisor team requirements on a scheduled rotation instead of short notice, mid-
tour, temporary duty, or IA. Scheduled rotation supports the monitor’s ability to improve 
stability at the unit level. Given that staffing is a zero sum game, vacancies will still exist; 
however, this process better supports today’s work-life balance in the all-volunteer force.  
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B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Follow-up research should examine what is required for training second or third 
iteration advisors. Tests should be conducted to survey the level of proficiency for teams 
on their second or third tours of advising. Teams could be split into groups of individuals 
who have or have not attended supplemental training to determine if full, supplemental, 
or no training is required prior to additional deployments. 
Additionally, once enough survey data is gathered, the MCSCG could request 
another thesis student to analyze this data. A minimum of 30 teams would need to 
complete the training and survey to provide a large enough sample for a valid survey. The 
results should be a detailed analysis of teams’ input on the appropriateness of the 
classroom instruction. First, develop and Beta test a survey to be used to evaluate pre-
deployment training. Second, collect survey data for X respondents over Y period of time 
to gain a better understanding of what is necessary during pre-deployment training for 
FSF advisor teams. These two examples of follow-on research will provide the MCSCG 
with enough data to decide what to keep, delete, or rework to provide the most complete 
program to Marines executing an SC mission.  
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APPENDIX A. QUESTION BANK DURING INTERVIEWS 






Who develops the mission? 
Who can requests a team? 
Who tasks-out manning? 
What is the driving factor for manning numbers? 
How long does it take from the time of the request, to having boots on the ground? 
How are personnel selected for the team? 
What phase in a person’s career path or current tour are they selected? Before PCS? After 
PCS? After being at a command for 1 or 2 years? 
What MOSs would make up an ideal team? 
What MOS should be a team leader? 
What MOS should be an operations officer? 
What billets are needed to make a team? How does this differ from MOS? 
What is an ideal team size? 
Should there be personnel dedicated to security and if so how many? 
Who, what MOS, should make up a police mentor team? 
Who, what MOS, should make up a boarder mentor team? 
Who, what MOS, should make up an army mentor team? 
Who should select the team? 
Should the team be built from different units or from the same unit? 
Who funds the personnel assigned to FSF? 
What precedence level does FSF receive? i.e., exempt, operational, priority, pro-share 
 
Training 
How long is the first time advisor training? 
How long is the previous advisor training? 
Are advisors assigned and MOS? ADMOS? 
What weight does that MOS carry? 
Who certifies the training? 
How long is a certification valid? 
Do historical training and after action files exist? 
What is the structure of the current training program? 
What level or amount of language proficiency is incorporated into the training? Defense 
language aptitude battery (DLAB)? 
How much culture is incorporated into the training? 
How much combat arms is incorporated into the training? 
What tactics are to be taught to foreign forces? 
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Is there a national training guideline? 
Who sets the requirements for the teams? 
What training must an advisor complete prior to checking in to the deploying unit? 
Who funds the collective training? 
Is the training specific to a country or is it generalized? 
How much first aid is taught? 
Is there any training that cannot be completed at the training facility and must be 
contracted out? 
What training is missing?  
What training was most important? 
What training was least important? 
Historically, what have the mentors found most important and least important in the 
training and what after action did the teams feel should be incorporated from experiences 
on the ground? 
 
Equipment 
Who supplies the equipment? 
Who provides maintenance on the equipment? 
What training is not provided prior to departure and must be completed once the team 
arrives at their destination? 
What equipment is missing? 
 
General 
What is the future of Foreign Security Force Advisors? 
Is there a plan to use them in other countries? If so, which countries? 
What is missing that this program needs the most? 
IS the mission of these teams to train or advise?  
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APPENDIX B. MCSCG BASIC ADVISOR COURSE CLASSES 
 Operational Culture 1 hour class—Expose students to the five 
dimensions of operational culture in order to assist with mission planning. 
This class gives a familiarization in applying Operation Culture when 
dealing with an FSF with respect to SC. 
 Building Relationships and Rapport 2 hour class—Learn the 
importance of establishing rapport with Foreign Security Force 
counterparts as a fundamental action of advising foreign counterparts to 
achieved desired U.S. endstates. This class explains how to establish a 
relationship with a FSF. 
 Cross-Culture Communications 2 hour class—Learn the difference 
between communication styles across the globe. Direct v. indirect; 
collective v. individualist, high v. low context, etc. Learn the importance 
of non-verbal communication. This class will show cultural differences, 
and communications verbally and non-verbally. 
 Recognize Cultural Stress 1 hour class—Learn the phases of cultural 
stress and the interrelationship with operational stress. Means to mitigate 
cultural stress are discussed. Recognizing stressors in a physical and 
metaphysical environment, and ways to mitigate stressors. 
 Social Perspective Taking 2 hour class—Gain an understanding of how a 
foreign counterpart’s perspectives influence his behavior. Learn a method 
to develop approaches to influence foreign counterparts. This class 
explains how to get past cultural nuances when dealing with an FSF. 
 Control Release of Info 1 hour class—A review of Operational Security 
(OPSEC) considerations within the context of a SC mission in a foreign 
country. Familiarizes the student on the procedures of releasing 
information to an FSF. 
 Communicate Through an Interpreter 1 hour class—Instructs the 
student how to plan and prepare to employ interpreters effectively when 
speaking to an FSF 
 Interacting with Media 1 hour class—Familiarizes students on how to 
employ PAO, develop proactive media posture, and respond to media 
inquiries. 
 Law of War & ROE in an SC Environment 3 hour class—Familiarizes 
students on the Laws of War and ROEs the team may face., 
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 Legal Considerations in an SC Environment 3 hour class—Defines the 
legal aspects and their implications while supporting an SC event. 
 Human Rights Awareness 1 hour class—This class gives the basics 
information of Human Rights violations and what to look out for while in 
country. 
 Analyze & Design a Security Cooperation Training Plan 5 hour 
class—This class gives a familiarization in Sourcing Documents and 
Training Plan Development. 
 Instructional Delivery Methods 8 hour class—Review and practical 
application of common instructional techniques that typically worked best 
with FSF in resource-limited operating environments. This class gives 
familiarization in lecture and non-lecture based instruction. 
 Develop a Security Cooperation Letter of Instruction 3 hour class—
Application of the third phase of the Systems Approach to Training 
Process to planning detailed training for FSF. Instructs how to develop an 
LOI based off the SCO’s guidance 
 Train the Foreign Security Force 2 hour class—Taught only to team 
leadership and staff. Student’s learn how to use the Marine Corps Systems 
Approach to Training Process to analyze higher guidance from national 
and campaign level planning documents to determine training objectives 
for the FSF they are assigned to train and advise. With this guidance, 
students learn to design effective and realistic training plans to achieve US 
objectives for the desired FSF security role. Focuses on the conduct and 
the evaluation phases of the SAT process and interaction with the FSF. 
 Range Operations 2 hour class—RSO and Range Set up procedures 
 Range Operations 1 hour class—Practical Application of terrain 
mitigation and SDZ restrictions. 
 Range Operations 1 hour class—Reinforcement of range operations 
fundamentals, processes, and procedures and their application to the 
design and implementation of live fire ranges in a foreign operating 
environment. Performance Evaluation of terrain mitigation and SDZ 
restrictions.  
 Counter Elicitation 1 hour class—Method used to recognize and mitigate 
elicitation in a foreign country. 
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 Surveillance Awareness 3 h hour class—Provides an overview of types 
of surveillance, indicators of surveillance, and how to drive a FP route, 
and reporting suspicious activity. 
 Surveillance Awareness (PA) 8 hour class—Familiarization with 
terrorist planning cycle and procedures to mitigate vulnerability of SC 
teams operating independently in foreign environments. This allows the 
students the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class. 
 Apprehension Avoidance 1 hour class—Review of fundamental martial 
arts techniques useful for SC team members to disengage from hostile 
encounters with foreigners while operating independently in a foreign 
country. Focus is on personnel keeping team integrity (especially while on 
liberty in small groups) and extricating themselves from undesirable 
situations. Provides methodology on how to gain SA and mitigate threats. 
 Apprehension Avoidance (PA) 6 hour class—This allows the students 
the opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class. 
 SERE B (+) 3 hour class—Provides an overview of types of isolation, and 
how to mitigate interrogation. 
 SERE B (+) (PA) 3 hour class—This allows the students the opportunity 
to practice the skills learned from the class. 
 (S) SERE 250 4 hour class—Classified. This class instructs the students 
to defeat personal restraints. 
 (S) SERE 250 (PA) 4 hour class—Classified. This allows the students the 
opportunity to practice the skills learned from the class. 
 Emergency Action Planning 2 hour class—Review of common 
components of Emergency Action Plans needed by SC teams operating 
independently in foreign countries. Heavy focus placed on procedures for 
recovery of missing personnel. Provides overview on how to plan on 
overseas contingencies based on DOS and DOD guidance. 
 Team Level Operations Center 1 hour class—Team Level Operations 
Center (PA) .5 hour class - This allows the students the opportunity to 
practice the skills learned from the class. 
Additional Courses that can be added to the Basic Advisor Course 
 High Risk Concealed Carry Course 32 hour class—Provides overview 
on defensive mindset, concepts of concealed carry, and advanced pistol 
marksmanship. 
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 HRCC Brief 1 hour class—This brief will teach the students the terms, 
different carries, and familiarizations they will utilize within the HRCC 
course. 
 Combat Lifesaver 12 hour class—This class gives the basics of medical 
treatment; Airways, Breathing, and Circulatory. 
 Regional/Country Medical Threat Brief (LP) 1 hour class—This class 
will inform the student about medical threats that are common in their 
geographical AOR. 
 Assess Geographic Medical Requirements 1 hour class—Geographical 
specifics as to medical threats and requirements found in their 
geographical AOR. 
 Advanced Tactical Driving (Contracted) 24 hour class—This will 
familiarize students with the fundamentals of defensive driving. 
 Language 40 hour class—This class, taught by CAOCL, teaches the 
students region specific language skills. 
 Foreign Weapons Tailored—Familiarization with a variety of foreign 
weapons systems. Focus is on nomenclature, assembly and disassembly, 
maintenance, and battle sight zero (BZO) procedures. The foreign 
weapons classes will be different per the area the SC Team will be going 
to. MCSCG currently has (19) foreign weapon systems to teach from. 
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APPENDIX C. INSTRUCTIONAL RATING FORM 
 
  




INSTRUCTIONAL RATING FORM 
One way instruction is improved is by sampling student reaction to the instruction.  To assist in improving this lesson, please 
answer the following questions.  This will assist the school in improving our courses. 
Instructor:  Date:  
Course:  Lesson:  
INSTRUCTIONS:  Circle the answer that indicates your level of agreement or disagreement as follows:  Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree=2, 
Agree=3, and Strongly Agree=4.  Please explain in the section labeled comments any ratings of 1 or 2.  If the question is not applicable, 
then circle NA. 







a. The instructor showed a thorough knowledge of the lesson material.   1 2 3 4  NA 
b. The instructor communicated the lesson material in a way that could 
be easily understood. 
1 2 3 4  NA 
c. The instructor gave precise instructions concerning in-class 
exercises. 
1 2 3 4  NA 
d. The instructor encouraged student participation. 1 2 3 4  NA 
e. Student’s questions were answered in a professional (not 
demeaning to the student) manner. 
1 2 3 4  NA 
2.  LESSON CONTENT 
a. The content was presented at the right pace. 1 2 3 4  NA 
b. The student outline aided my understanding of the content covered. 1 2 3 4  NA 
c. The environment of the class was interactive. 1 2 3 4  NA 
3.  SAFETY 
a. Lesson related safety to job performance. 1 2 3 4  NA 
b. Cease Training procedures were adequately explained. 1 2 3 4  NA 
c. Safety precautions were reemphasized prior to commencing tasks. 1 2 3 4  NA 
d. Safety was paramount at all times. 1 2 3 4  NA 
e. Equipment/material was safe for use. 1 2 3 4  NA 
4.  METHODS/MEDIA:  
a. The in-class exercises required in the course were worthwhile 
learning experiences. 
1 2 3 4  NA 
b. The way that the class material was presented enhanced my ability 
to learn/perform the concept/task. 
             I especially liked the ___________________________ method. 
 
1 2 3 4  NA 
c. The media complimented instruction. 1 2 3 4  NA 
5.  STUDENT:  Circle the answer that best describes your knowledge level.












Name___________________________  Parent Unit: ___________________________________ 
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APPENDIX F. PROPOSED DATA COLLECTION SURVEY 
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Basic Course Survey 
 
Survey Consent and Privacy Act Statement 
 
AUTHORITY: The United States Marine Corps may collect the information requested 
in this study under the authority of 10 United States Code, Section 2358, “Research and 
Development Projects.” In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-
579), this notice informs you of the purpose, use, and confidentiality of this study.  
 
PURPOSE: The purpose of the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Basic Course Survey 
is to collect information on the usage and general quality of selected Advisor training to 
aid MCSCG in training resource allocation and to identify areas requiring improvement.  
 
ROUTINE USES: Data gathered through this study will be analyzed and results will be 
provided to MCSCG leadership and its training organizations responsible for individual 
and unit training used to prepare Marines for deployment.  
 
DISCLOSURE: Participating in this survey is voluntary and you may choose at any time 
not to participate. There is no penalty for choosing not to participate.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: We will NOT identify you, or attribute comments to any 
particular participant and we will NOT include your name or other personally identifiable 
information in our report. Likewise, we ask that you respect the confidential nature of this 
survey, by not identifying individual participants with comments made or heard during 
this session. We cannot provide “confidentiality” or “non-attribution,” to a participant 
regarding information provided that involves criminal activity/behavior, or statements 
that pose a threat to yourself or others. Do NOT discuss or comment on classified or 
operationally sensitive information during this survey.  
 
CONTACT: For further information about this study or your rights as a participant an e-
mail and phone number will be provided, upon request, to contact MCSCG G3. Please 




 Month (MMM) Year (YYYY)  Deployment lengths (in Months) 
Deployment Start date     
 
 Must be consistent with the rest of your team 








        
 
 Completion of 3 week training Post Deployment 
Immediately after…   
 
 I MEF II MEF III MEF 
Command    
 
 4 digit MOS 
MOS  
 












Education       
 
 Below 20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-over 
age        
 
 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 24-29 30-over 
Years of 
Service 
       
 
 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 24-29 30-over 
Team Size        
 
 E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Enlisted 
Rank 
       
 
 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 
Officer 
Rank 
      
*PRIOR ENLIST OFFICERS FILL IN BOTH ENLISTED AND OFFICER 
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Section 1—Advisor Skills Module Classes 
 
Operational Culture 1 hour class—This class gives a familiarization in applying Operation 
Culture when dealing with an FSF with respect to SC. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Building Relationships and Rapport 2 hour class—This class explains how to introduce a 
relationship with a FSF 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Cross-Culture Communications 2 hour class—This class will show cultural differences, and 
communications verbally and non-verbally 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Recognize Cultural Stress 1 hour class—Recognizing stressors in a physical and metaphysical 
environment, and ways to mitigate stressors. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Social Perspective Taking 2 hour class—This class explains how to get past cultural nuances 
when dealing with an FSF. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         




Control Release of Info 1 hour class—Familiarizes the student on the procedures of releasing 
information to an FSF 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Communicate Through an Interpreter 1 hour class—Instructs the student on how to speak to 
an FSF through the use of an interpreter 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 












Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Law of War & ROE in an SC Environment 3 hour class—Familiarizes students on the Laws 
of War and ROEs the team may face 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Legal Considerations in an SC Environment 3 hour class—Defines the legal aspects and their 
implications while supporting an SC event. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         






Human Rights Awareness 1 Hour class—This class gives the basics information of Human 
Rights violations and what to look out for while in country. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Section 2—Foreign Security Force Training Management 
Module Classes  
 
Analyze & Design a Security Cooperation Training Plan 5 hour class—This class gives a 
familiarization in Sourcing Documents and Training Plan Development. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Instructional Delivery Methods 8 hour class—This class gives familiarization in lecture and 
non-lecture based instruction. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Develop a Security Cooperation Letter of Instruction 3 hour class—Instructs how to develop 
an LOI based off the SCO’s guidance 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Train the Foreign Security Force 2 hour class—Focuses on the conduct and the evaluation 
phases of the SAT process and interaction with the FSF. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
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Range Operations 2 hour class—RSO and Range Set up procedures 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 












Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 












Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Operating Skills / Force Protection Module Classes Hours of class—Description 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Section 3—Operating Skills/Force Protection Module Classes 
 
Counter Elicitation 1 hr—Method used to mitigate elicitation in a foreign country. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         







Surveillance Awareness 3 hrs—Provides an overview of types of surveillance, indicators of 
surveillance, and how to drive a FP route, and reporting suspicious activity. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Surveillance Awareness (PA) 8 hrs—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the 
skills learned from the class. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Apprehension Avoidance 1 hr—Provides methodology on how to gain SA and mitigate threats. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Apprehension Avoidance (PA) 6 hrs—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the 
skills learned from the class. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
SERE B (+)3 hrs—Provides an overview of types of isolation, and how to mitigate interrogation. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         








SERE B (+) (PA) 3 hrs—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned 
from the class. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
(S) SERE 250 4 hrs—This class instructs the students to defeat personal restraints. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 (S) SERE 250 (PA) 4 hrs—This allows the students the opportunity to practice the skills learned 
from the class. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Emergency Action Planning 2 hrs—Provides overview on how to plan on overseas 
contingencies based on DOS and DOD guidance. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 












Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         







Team Level Operations Center (PA) .5 hrs—This allows the students the opportunity to 
practice the skills learned from the class. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
High Risk Concealed Carry Course 32 hrs—Provides overview on defensive mindset, concepts 
of concealed carry, and advanced pistol marksmanship. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
HRCC Brief 1hr—This brief will teach the students the terms, different carries, and 
familiarizations they will utilize within the HRCC course. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 












Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Regional/Country Medical Threat Brief (LP) 1 hr—This class will inform the student about 
medical threats that are common in their geographical AOR. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         





Assess Geographic Medical Requirements 1 hr—Geographical specifics as to medical threats 
and requirements found in their geographical AOR. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Section 4—Additional Training 
 
Advanced Tactical Driving (Contracted) 24 hrs—This will familiarize students with the 
fundamentals of defensive driving. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 












Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
Class was Relevant         
 
Foreign Weapons Tailored—The foreign weapons classes will be different per the area the SC 
Team will be going to. We currently have (19) different weapon systems that we can teach from. 
 Don’t 
Recall 








Amply Classroom Time         
Instructor Delivery          
Class Organization         
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